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Abstract. We study the problem of allocating multiple users to a set
of wireless channels in a decentralized manner when the channel quali-
ties are time-varying and unknown to the users, and accessing the same
channel by multiple users leads to reduced quality due to interference.
In such a setting the users not only need to learn the inherent channel
quality and at the same time the best allocations of users to channels
so as to maximize the social welfare. Assuming that the users adopt a
certain online learning algorithm, we investigate under what conditions
the socially optimal allocation is achievable. In particular we examine
the effect of different levels of knowledge the users may have and the
amount of communications and cooperation. The general conclusion is
that when the cooperation of users decreases and the uncertainty about
channel payoffs increases it becomes harder to achieve the socially opti-
mal allocation.
Keywords: multi-user learning, multi-armed bandits, spectrum sharing, con-
gestion games
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the dynamic spectrum access and spectrum sharing prob-
lem in a learning context. Specifically, we consider a set of N common channels
shared by a set of M users. A channel has time varying rate r(t), and its statis-
tics are not completely known by the users. Thus each user needs to employ
some type of learning to figure out which channels are of better quality, e.g., in
terms of their average achievable rates. At the same time, simultaneous use of
the same channel by multiple users will result in reduced rate due to interference
or collision. The precise form of this performance degradation may or may not
be known to the user. Thus the users also need to use learning to avoid excess
interference or congestion. Furthermore, each user may have private information
that is not shared, e.g., users may perceive channel quality differently due to
difference in location as well as individual modulation/coding schemes.
Without a central agent, and in the presence of information decentralization
described above, we are interested in the following questions: (1) for a given
common learning algorithm, does the multiuser learning process converge, and
(2) if it does, what is the quality of the equilibrium point with respect to a
globally optimal spectrum allocation scheme, one that could be computed for a
global objective function with full knowledge of channel statistics as well as the
users’ private information.
A few recent studies have addressed these questions in some special cases.
For instance, in [3] it was shown that learning using a sample-mean based index
policy leads to a socially optimal (sum of individual utilities) allocation when
channels evolve as iid processes and colliding players get zero reward provided
that this optimal allocation is such that each user occupies one of the M best
channels (in terms of average rates). This precludes the possibility that not all
users may have the same set ofM best channels, and that in some cases the best
option is for multiple users to share a common channel, e.g., when N < M .
In this study we investigate under what conditions the socially optimal al-
location is achievable by considering different levels of communication (or coop-
eration) allowed among users, and different levels of uncertainty on the channel
statistics. The general conclusion, as intuition would suggest, is that when the
cooperation of users increases and the channel uncertainty decreases it becomes
easier to achieve the socially optimal welfare. Specifically, we assume that the
rate (or reward) user i gets from channel j at time t is of the form rj(t)gj(nj(t))
where rj(t) is the rate of channel j at time t, nj(t) is the number of users using
channel j at time t, and gj is the user independent interference function (IF) for
channel j. This model is richer than the previously used models [3,14,16] since
rj(t) can represent environmental effects such as fading or primary user activity,
while gj captures interactions between users. We consider the following three
cases.
In the first case (C1), each channel evolves as an iid random process in time,
the users do not know the channel statistics, nor the form of the interference, nor
the total number of users present in the system, and no direct communication
is allowed among users. A user can measure the overall rate it gets from using
a channel but cannot tell how much of it is due to the dynamically changing
channel quality (i.e., what it would get if it were the only user) vs. interference
from other users. In this case, we show that if all users follow the Exp3 algorithm
[7] then the channel allocation converges to a set of pure Nash equilibria (PNE)
of a congestion game defined by the IFs and mean channel rates. In this case a
socially optimal allocation cannot be ensured, as the set of PNE are of different
quality, and in some cases the socially optimal allocation may not be a PNE.
In the second case (C2), each channel again evolves as an iid random process
in time, whose statistics are unknown to the user. However, the users now know
the total number of users in the system, as well as the fact that the quantitative
impact of interference is common to all users (i.e., user independent), though
the actual form of the interference function is unknown. In other words the rate
of channel j at time t is perceived by user i as hj(t, nj(t)) so user i cannot
distinguish between components rj(t) and gj(nj(t)). Furthermore, users are now
allowed minimal amount of communication when they happen to be in the same
channel, specifically to find out the total number of simultaneous users of that
channel. In this case we present a sample-mean based randomized learning policy
that achieves socially optimal allocation as time goes to infinity, with a sub-linear
regret over the time horizon with respect to the socially optimal allocation.
In the third case (C3), as in case (C2) the users know the total number
of users in the system, as well as the fact that the IF is user independent and
decreasing without knowing the actual form of the IF. However, the channels are
assumed to have constant, albeit unknown, rates. We show that even without
any communication among users, there is a randomized learning algorithm that
achieves the socially optimal allocation in finite time.
It’s worth pointing out that in the settings outlined above, the users are
non-strategic, i.e., each user simply follow a pre-set learning rule rather than
playing a game. In this context it is reasonable to introduce minimal amount of
communication among users and assume they may cooperate. It is possible that
even in this case the users may not know their IF but only the total rate they
get for lack of better detecting capabilities (e.g., they may only be able to detect
the total received SNR as a result of channel rate and user interference).
Online learning by a single user was studied by [1,4,6,15], in which sample-
mean based index policies were shown to achieve logarithmic regret with respect
to the best single-action policy without a priori knowledge of the statistics, and
are order-optimal, when the rewards are given by an iid process. In [5,21,22]
Markovian rewards are considered, with [22] focusing on restless reward pro-
cesses, where a process continues to evolve according to a Markov chain regard-
less of the users’ actions. In all these studies learning algorithms were developed
to achieve logarithmic regret. Multi-user learning with iid reward processes have
been studied in a dynamic spectrum context by [3,11,16], with a combinatorial
structure adopted in [11], and with collision and random access models in [3,16].
In [13], convergence of multi-user learning with Exp3 algorithm to pure Nash
equilibrium is investigated under the collision and fair sharing models. In the col-
lision model, when there is more than one user on a channel all get zero reward,
whereas in the random access model one of them, selected randomly, gets all the
reward while others get zero reward. In the fair sharing model, a user’s utility is
inversely proportional to the number of users who are on the same channel with
the user. Note that these models do not capture more sophisticated communi-
cation schemes where the rate a user gets is a function of the received SNR of
the form gj(n) = fj(
Pt
N0+(n−1)Pt
) = where Pt is the nominal transmit power of
all users and N0 the noise. Moreover, in the above studies the socially optimal
allocation is a rather simple one: it is the orthogonal allocation of users to the
first M channels with the highest mean rewards. By contrast, we model a more
general interference relationship among users, in which an allocation with users
sharing the same channel may be the socially optimal one. The socially optimal
allocations is not trivial in this case and additional mechanisms may be needed
for the learning algorithms to converge.
All of the above mentioned work assumes some level of communication be-
tween the users either at the beginning or during the learning. If we assume
no communication between the users, achieving the socially optimal allocation
seems very challenging in general. Then one may ask if it is possible to achieve
some kind of equilibrium allocation. Kleinberg et. al. [14] showed that it is pos-
sible for the case when the channel rates are constant and the users do not
know the IFs. They show that when the users use aggregate monotonic selection
dynamics, a variant of Hedge algorithm [10], the allocation converges to weakly
stable equilibria which is a subset of Nash equilibria (NE) of the congestion game
defined by the IFs. They show that for almost all congestion games weakly stable
equilibria is the same as PNE.
Other than the work described above [2] considers spatial congestion games, a
generalization of congestion games and gives conditions under which there exists
a PNE and best-response play converges to PNE. A mechanism design approach
for socially optimal power allocation when users are strategic is considered in
[12].
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we
present the notations and definitions that will be used throughout the paper.
In Sects. 3, 4, 5 we analyze the cases stated in (C1), (C2), (C3) and derive the
results respectively. Conclusion and future research is given in Sect. 6.
2 Preliminaries
Denote the set of users by M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}, and the set of channels N =
{1, 2, . . . , N}. Time is slotted and indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . and a user can select
a single channel at each time step t. Without loss of generality let rj(t) ∈ [0, 1]
be the rate of channel j at time t such that {rj(t)}t=1,2,... is generated by an
iid process with support [0, 1] and mean µj ∈ [0, 1]. Let gj : N → [0, 1] be the
interference function (IF) on channel j where gj(n) represents the interference
when there are n users on channel j. We express the rate of channel j seen by
a user as hj(t) = rj(t)gj(nj(t)) when a user does not know the total number of
users nj(t) using channel j at time t as in cases (C1) and (C3). When a user knows
nj(t), we express the rate of channel j at time t as hj,nj(t)(t) = rj(t)gj(nj(t)) as
in case (C2). Let Si = N be the set of feasible actions of user i and σi ∈ Si be the
action, i.e., channel selected by user i. Let S = S1×S2× . . .×SN = NM be the
set of feasible action profiles and σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σM} ∈ S be the action profile
of the users. Throughout the discussion we assume that the action of player i at
time t, i.e., σπii (t) is determined by the policy πi. When πi is deterministic, πi(t)
is in general a function from all past observations and decisions of user i to the set
of actions Si. When πi is randomized, πi(t) generates a probability distribution
over the set of actions Si according to all past observations and decisions of user
i from which the action at time t is sampled. Since the dependence of actions to
the policy is trivial we use σi(t) to denote the action of user i at time t, dropping
the superscript πi.
Let Kj(σ) be the set of users on channel j when the action profile is σ. Let
A∗ = argmaxσ∈S
∑M
i=1 µσigσi(Kσi(σ)) = argmaxσ∈S
∑N
j=1 µjKj(σ)gj(Kj(σ))
be the set of socially optimal allocations and denote by σ∗ any action profile
that is in the set A∗. Let v∗ denote the socially optimal welfare, i.e., v∗ =∑M
i=1 µσ∗i gσ∗i (Kσ∗i (σ
∗)) and v∗j denote the payoff a user gets from channel j
under the socially optimal allocation, i.e., v∗j = µjgj(Kj(σ
∗)) if Kj(σ
∗) 6= 0.
Note that any permutation of actions in σ∗ is also a socially optimal allocation
since IFs are user-independent.
For any policy π, the regret at time n is
R(n) = nv∗ − E
[
n∑
t=1
M∑
i=1
rσi(t)(t)gσi(t)(Kσi(t)(σ(t)))
]
,
where expectation is taken with respect to the random nature of the rates and
the randomization of the policy. Note that for a deterministic policy expectation
is only taken with respect to the random nature of the rates. For any randomized
policy πi, let pi(t) = (pi1(t), pi2(t), . . . , piN (t)) be the mixed strategy of user i at
time t, i.e., a probability distribution on {1, 2, . . . , N}. For a profile of policies
π = [π1, π2, . . . , πM ] for the users let p(t) = (p1(t)
T , p2(t)
T , . . . pM (t)
T )T be
the profile of mixed strategies at time t, where pi(t)
T is the transpose of pi(t).
Then σi(t) is the action sampled from the probability distribution pi(t). The
dependence of p to π is trivial and not shown in the notation.
3 Allocations Achievable with Exp3 Algorithm (Case 1)
We start by defining a congestion game. A congestion game [17,18] is given by
the tuple (M,N , (Σi)i∈M, (hj)j∈N ), where M denotes a set of players (users),
N a set of resources (channels), Σi ⊂ 2N the strategy space of player i, and
hj : N → R a payoff function associated with resource j, which is a function of
the number of players using that resource. It is well known that a congestion
game has a potential function and the local maxima of the potential function
corresponds to PNE, and every sequence of asynchronous improvement steps is
finite and converges to PNE.
In this section we relate the strategy update rule of Exp3 [7] under assump-
tions (C1) to a congestion game. Exp3 as given in Fig. 1 is a randomized al-
gorithm consisting of an exploration parameter γ and weights wij that depend
exponentially on the past observations where i denotes the user and j denotes
the channel. Each user runs Exp3 independently but we explicitly note the user
dependence because a user’s action affects other users’ updates.
At any time step before the channel rate and user actions are drawn from
the corresponding distributions, let Rj denote the random variable correspond-
ing to the reward of the jth channel. Let Gij = gj(1 + K
′
j(i)) be the random
variable representing the payoff user i gets from channel j where K ′j(i) is the
random variable representing the number of users on channel j other than user
i. Let Uij = RjGij and u¯ij = Ej [E−i[Uij ]] be the expected payoff to user i by
using channel j where E−i represents the expectation taken with respect to the
randomization of players other than i, Ej represents the expectation taken with
respect to the randomization of the rate of channel j. Since the channel rate is
independent of users’ actions u¯ij = µj g¯ij where g¯ij = E−i[Gij ].
Exp3 (for user i)
1: Initialize: γ ∈ (0, 1), wij(t) = 1, ∀j ∈ N , t = 1
2: while t > 0 do
3:
pij(t) = (1 − γ)
wij(t)∑N
l=1 wil(t)
+
γ
N
4: Sample σi(t) from the distribution on pi(t) = [pi1(t), pi2(t), . . . , piN (t)]
5: Play channel σi(t) and receive reward hσi(t)(t)
6: for j = 1, 2, . . . , N do
7: if j = σi(t) then
8: Set wij(t+ 1) = wij(t) exp
(
γhσi(t)(t)
pij(t)N
)
9: else
10: Set wij(t+ 1) = wij(t)
11: end if
12: end for
13: t = t+ 1
14: end while
Fig. 1. pseudocode of Exp3
Lemma 1. Under (C1) when all players use Exp3, the derivative of the continuous-
time limit of Exp3 is the replicator equation given by
ξij =
1
N
(µjpij)
N∑
l=1
pil(g¯ij − g¯il) .
Proof. Note that
(1 − γ)wij(t) =
N∑
l=1
wil(t)
(
pij(t)−
γ
N
)
. (1)
We consider the effect of user i’s action σi(t) on his probability update on channel
j. We have two cases: σi(t) = j and σi(t) 6= j. Let A
γ,t
i,j = exp
(
γUij(t)
pij(t)N
)
.
Consider the case σi(t) = j.
pij(t+ 1) =
(1 − γ)wij(t)A
γ,t
i,j∑N
l=1 wil(t) + wij(t)
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
) + γ
N
. (2)
Substituting (1) into (2)
pij(t+ 1) =
∑N
l=1 wil(t)
(
pij(t)−
γ
N
)
Aγ,ti,j∑N
l=1 wil(t)
(
1 +
pij(t)−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
)) + γN
=
(
pij(t)−
γ
N
)
Aγ,ti,j
1 +
pij(t)−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
) + γ
N
.
The continuous time process is obtained by taking the limit γ → 0, i.e., the
rate of change in pij with respect to γ as γ → 0. Then, dropping the discrete
time script t,
˙pij = lim
γ→0
dpij
dγ
= lim
γ→0
(
−1
N A
γ,t
i,j +
(
pij −
γ
N
) Uij
pijN
Aγ,ti,j
)(
1 +
pij−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
))
(
1 +
pij−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
))2
+
(
pij −
γ
N
)
Aγ,ti,j
(
pij−
1
N
(1−γ)2A
γ,t
i,j +
pij−
1
N
1−γ
(
γ
NA
γ,t
i,j
))
(
1 +
pij−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,j − 1
))2 + 1N
=
Uij(1− pij)
N
. (3)
Consider the case σi(t) = k 6= j. Then,
pij(t+ 1) =
(1− γ)wij(t)∑N
l=1 wil(t) + wik(t)
(
Aγ,ti,k − 1
) + γ
N
=
pij(t)−
γ
N
1 +
pik(t)−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,k − 1
) + γ
N
.
Thus
˙pij = lim
γ→0
−1
N
(
1 +
pik−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,k − 1
))
(
1 +
pik−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,k − 1
))2
+
(
pij −
γ
N
) (pik− 1N
(1−γ)2A
γ,t
i,k +
pik−
1
N
1−γ
(
γ
NA
γ,t
i,k
))
(
1 +
pik−
γ
N
1−γ
(
Aγ,ti,k − 1
))2 + 1N
= −
pikUik
N
. (4)
Then from (3) and (4), the expected change in pij with respect to the prob-
ability distribution pi of user i over the channels is
p¯ij = Ei[p˙ij ] =
1
N
pij
∑
l∈N−{j}
pil(Uij − Uil).
Taking the expectation with respect to the randomization of channel rates and
other users’ actions we have
ξij = Ej [E−i[p¯ij ]]
=
1
N
pij
∑
l∈N−{j}
pil (Ej [E−i[Uij ]]− Ej [E−i[Uil]])
=
1
N
(µjpij)
N∑
l=1
pil(g¯ij − g¯il) .
⊓⊔
Lemma 1 shows that the dynamics of a user’s probability distribution over the
actions is given by a replicator equation which is commonly studied in evolu-
tionary game theory [19,20]. With this lemma we can establish the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. For all but a measure zero subset of [0, 1]2N from which the µj’s
and gj’s are selected, when γ in Exp3 is arbitrarily small, the action profile
converges to the set of PNE of the congestion game (M,N , (Si)i∈M, (µjgj)j∈N ).
Proof. Because the replicator equation in Lemma 1 is identical to the replicator
equation in [14], the proof of converge to PNE follows from [14]. Here, we briefly
explain the steps in the proof. Defining the expected potential function to be
the expected value of the potential function φ where expectation is taken with
respect to the user’s randomization one can show that the solutions of the repli-
cator equation converges to the set of fixed points. Then the stability analysis
using the Jacobian matrix yields that every stable fixed point corresponds to a
Nash equilibrium. Then one can prove that for any stable fixed point the eigen-
values of the Jacobian must be zero. This implies that every stable fixed point
corresponds to a weakly stable Nash equilibrium strategy in the game theoretic
sense. Then using tools from algebraic geometry one can show that almost every
weakly stable Nash equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium of the congestion
game.
We also need to investigate the error introduced by treating the discrete time
update rule as a continuous time process. However, by taking γ infinitesimal
we can approximate the discrete time process by the continuous time process.
For a discussion when γ is not infinitesimal one can define approximately stable
equilibria [14]. ⊓⊔
The main difference between Exp3 and Hedge [14] is that in Exp3 users
do not need to observe the payoffs from the channels that they do not select,
whereas Hedge assumes complete observation. In addition to that, we considered
the dynamic channel rates which is not considered in [14].
4 An Algorithm for Socially Optimal Allocation with
Sub-linear Regret (Case 2)
In this section we propose an algorithm whose regret with respect to the so-
cially optimal allocation is O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M ) for γ > 0 arbitrarily small. Clearly
this regret is sublinear and approaches linear as the number of users M in-
creases. This means that the time average of the sum of the utilities of the play-
ers converges to the socially optimal welfare. Let K = {k = (k1, k2, . . . , kN ) :
kj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ N , k1 + k2 + . . . + kN = M} denote an allocation of M users
to N channels. Note that this allocation gives only the number of users on
each channel. It does not say anything about which user uses which chan-
nel. We assume that the socially optimal allocation is unique up to permu-
tations so k∗ = argmaxk∈K
∑N
j=1 µjkjgj(kj) is unique. We also assume the
following stability condition of the socially optimal allocation. Let vj(kj) =
µjgj(kj). Then the stability condition says that argmaxk∈K
∑N
j=1 kj vˆj(kj) = k
∗
if |vˆj(k) − vj(k)| ≤ ǫ, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, ∀j ∈ N , for some ǫ > 0, where
vˆj : N → R is an arbitrary function. Let T ij,k(t) be the number of times user
i used channel j and observed k users on it up to time t. We refer to the
tuple (j, k) as an arm. Let nij,k(t) be the time of the tth observation of user
i from arm (j, k). Let uij,k(t) be the sample mean of the rewards from arm
(j, k) seen by user i at the end of the tth play of arm (j, k) by user i, i.e.,
uij,k(t) = (hj,k(n
i
j,k(1)) + . . . + hj,k(n
i
j,k(t)))/t. Then the socially optimal allo-
cation estimated by user i at time t is ki∗(t) = argmaxk∈K
∑N
j=1 kju
i
j,k(t). The
pseudocode of the Randomized Learning Algorithm (RLA) is given in Fig. 2. At
time t RLA explores with probability 1/(t
1
2M−
γ
M ) by randomly choosing one of
the channels and exploits with probability 1−1/(t
1
2M−
γ
M ) by choosing a channel
which is occupied by a user in the estimated socially optimal allocation.
The following will be useful in the proof of the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 2. Let Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . be a sequence of independent Bernoulli random
variables such that Xi has mean qi with 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1. Let X¯k =
1
k
∑k
i=1Xi ,
q¯k =
1
k
∑k
i=1 qi. Then for any constant ǫ ≥ 0 and any integer n ≥ 0,
P
(
X¯n − q¯n ≤ −ǫ
)
≤ e−2nǫ
2
. (5)
Proof. The result follows from symmetry and [9]. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. For p > 0, p 6= 1
(n+ 1)1−p − 1
1− p
<
n∑
t=1
1
tp
< 1 +
n1−p − 1
1− p
(6)
Proof. See [8]. ⊓⊔
RLA (for user i)
1: Initialize: 0 < γ << 1, uij,k(1) = 0, T
i
j,k(1) = 0, ∀j ∈ N , k ∈ M, t = 1,
sample σi(1) uniformly from N .
2: while t > 0 do
3: play channel σi(t), observe l(t) the total number of players using channel
σi(t) and reward hσi(t),l(t)(t).
4: Set T iσi(t),l(t)(t+ 1) = T
i
σi(t),l(t)
(t) + 1.
5: Set T ij,l(t+ 1) = T
i
j,l(t) for (j, l) 6= (σi(t), l(t)).
6: Set uiσi(t),l(t)(t+ 1) =
T iσi(t),l(t)
(t)uiσi(t),l(t)
(t)+hσi(t),l(t)(t)
T i
σi(t),l(t)
(t+1)
.
7: Set uij,l(t+ 1) = u
i
j,l(t) for (j, l) 6= (σi(t), l(t)).
8: Set ki∗(t+ 1) = argmaxk∈K
∑N
j=1 kju
i
j,kj
(t+ 1).
9: Set θ∗i(t+1) to be the set of channels used by at least one user in k∗i(t+1).
10: Draw it randomly from Bernoulli distribution with P (it = 1) =
1
t(1/2M)−γ/M
11: if it = 0 then
12: if σi(t) ∈ θ∗(t+ 1) and l(t) = ki∗j (t+ 1) then
13: σi(t+ 1) = σi(t)
14: else
15: σi(t+1) is selected uniformly at random from the channels in θ
∗(t+1).
16: end if
17: else
18: Draw σi(t+ 1) uniformly at random from N .
19: end if
20: t = t+ 1
21: end while
Fig. 2. pseudocode of RLA
Theorem 2. When all players use RLA the regret with respect to the socially
optimal allocation is O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M ) where γ can be arbitrarily small.
Proof. Let H(t) be the event that at time t there exists at least one user that
computed the socially optimal allocation incorrectly. Let ω be a sample path.
Then
n∑
t=1
I(ω ∈ H(t)) ≤
n∑
t=1
M∑
i=1
I(k∗i(t) 6= k∗)
≤
(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
I(|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t)) − vj(l)| ≥ ǫ)
=(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ, T
i
j,l(t) ≥
a ln t
ǫ2
)
+
(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ, T
i
j,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
(7)
Let ǫij,k(t) =
√
a ln t
T ij,k(t)
. Then T ij,k(t) ≥
a ln t
ǫ2 ⇒ ǫ ≥
√
a ln t
T ij,k(t)
= ǫij,k(t). There-
fore,
I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ, T
i
j,l(t) ≥
a ln t
ǫ2
)
≤ I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t)) − vj(l)| ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ, T
i
j,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
≤ I
(
T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
Then, continuing from (7),
n∑
t=1
I(ω ∈ H(t))
≤
(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
(
I
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
+ I
(
T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
))
(8)
Taking the expectation over (8),
E
[
n∑
t=1
I(ω ∈ H(t))
]
≤
(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
P
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
+
(n,M,N,M)∑
(t,i,j,l)=(1,1,1,1)
P
(
T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
. (9)
We have
P
(
|uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l)| ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
= P
(
uij,l(T
i
j,l(t))− vj(l) ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
+ P
(
uij,l(T
i
j,l(t)) − vj(l) ≤ −ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
= P
(
Sij,l(T
i
j,l(t))
T ij,l(t)
− vj(l) ≥ ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
+ P
(
Sij,l(T
i
j,l(t))
T ij,l(t)
− vj(l) ≤ −ǫ
i
j,l(t)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2(T ij,l(t))
2(ǫij,l(t))
2
T ij,l(t)
)
= 2 exp
(
−
2T ij,l(t)a ln t
T ij,l(t)
)
=
2
t2a
, (10)
where (10) follows from the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality.
Now we will bound P
(
T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
. Let TRij,l(t) be the number of time
steps in which player i played channel j and observed l users on channel j in the
time steps where all players randomized up to time t. Then
{ω : T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
} ⊂ {ω : TRij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
},
(11)
Thus
P
(
T ij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
≤ P
(
TRij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
. (12)
Now we define new Bernoulli random variables X ij,l(s) as follows: X
i
j,l(s) = 1
if all players randomize at time s and player i selects channel j and observes l
players on it according to the random draw. X ij,l(s) = 0 else. Then TR
i
j,l(t) =∑t
s=1X
i
j,l(s). P (X
i
j,l(s) = 1) = ρspl where pl =
(M−1l−1 )(
M+N−l−2
N−2 )
(M+N−1N−1 )
and ρs =
1
s(1/2)−γ
. Let st =
∑t
s=1
1
s(1/2)−γ
Then
P
(
TRij,l(t) <
a ln t
ǫ2
)
= P
(
TRij,l(t)
t
−
pkst
t
<
a ln t
tǫ2
−
pkst
t
)
≤ P
(
TRij,l(t)
t
−
pkst
t
<
a ln t
tǫ2
−
pk(t+ 1)
(1/2)+γ − 1
t((1/2) + γ)
)
, (13)
where (13) follows from Lemma 3. Let τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, a) be the time that for
all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
pk(t+ 1)
(1/2)+γ − 1
t((1/2) + γ)
−
a ln t
tǫ2
≥ t(1/2)+γ
′
, (14)
where 0 < γ′ < γ. Then for all t ≥ τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, a) (14) will hold since RHS
increases faster than LHS. Thus we have for t ≥ τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, a)
P
(
TRij,l(t)
t
−
pkst
t
<
a ln t
tǫ2
−
pk(t+ 1)
(1/2)+γ − 1
t((1/2) + γ)
)
≤ P
(
TRij,l(t)
t
−
pkst
t
< t−(1/2)+γ
′
)
≤ e−2tt
2γ′−1
= e−2t
2γ′
≤ e−2 ln t =
1
t2
. (15)
Let a = 1. Then continuing from (9) by substituting (10) and (15) we have
E
[
n∑
t=1
I(ω ∈ H(t))
]
≤M2N
(
τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, 1) + 3
n∑
t=1
1
t2
)
. (16)
Thus we proved that the expected number of time steps in which there exists
at least one user that computed the socially optimal allocation incorrectly is
finite. Note that because RLA explores with probability 1
t1/2M−γ/M
, the expected
number of time steps in which all the players are not randomizing up to time n
is
n∑
t=1
(
1−
(
1−
1
t(1/2M)−γ/M
)M)
≤
n∑
t=1
M
t1/2M−γ/M
= O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M ). (17)
Note that players can choose γ arbitrarily small, increasing the finite regret due
to τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, 1). Thus if we are interested in the asymptotic performance
then γ > 0 can be arbitrarily small.
Now we do the worst case analysis. We classify the time steps into two. Good
time steps in which all the players know the socially optimal allocation correctly
and none of the players randomize excluding the randomizations done for settling
down to the socially optimal allocation. Bad time steps in which there exists a
player that does not know the socially optimal allocation correctly or there is
a player that randomizes excluding the randomizations done for settling down
to the socially optimal allocation. The number of Bad time steps in which there
exists a player that does not know the socially optimal allocation correctly is
finite while the number of time steps in which there is a player that randomizes
excluding the randomizations done for settling down to the socially optimal
allocation is O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M ). The worst case is when each bad step is followed by
a good step. Then from this good step the expected number of times to settle
down to the socially optimal allocation is
(
1− 1
(M+z
∗
−1
z∗−1 )
)
/
(
1
(M+z
∗
−1
z∗−1 )
)
where
z∗ is the number of channels which has at least one user in the socially optimal
allocation. Assuming in the worst case the sum of the utilities of the players is
0 when they are not playing the socially optimal allocation we have
R(n) ≤
1− 1
(M+z
∗
−1
z∗−1 )
1
(M+z
∗
−1
z∗−1 )
(
M2N
(
τ(M,N, ǫ, γ, γ′, 1) + 3
n∑
t=1
1
t2
)
+O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M )
)
= O(n
2M−1+2γ
2M )
⊓⊔
Note that we mentioned earlier, under a classical multi-armed bandit prob-
lem approach as cited before [3,4,5,15,16,21,22], a logarithmic regret O(log n) is
achievable. The fundamental difference between these studies and the problem
in the present paper is the following: Assume that at time t user i selects channel
j. This means that i selects to observe an arm from the set {(j, k) : k ∈ M} but
the arm assigned to i is selected from this set depending on the choices of other
players.
Also note that in RLA a user computes the socially optimal allocation accord-
ing to its estimates at each time step. This could pose significant computational
effort since integer programming is NP-hard in general. However, by exploiting
the stability condition on the socially optimal allocation a user may reduce the
number of computations; this is a subject of future research.
5 An Algorithm for Socially Optimal Allocation (Case 3)
In this section we assume that gj(n) is decreasing in n for all j ∈ N . For
simplicity we assume that the socially optimal allocation is unique up to the
permutations of σ∗. When this uniqueness assumption does not hold we need a
more complicated algorithm to achieve the socially optimal allocation. All users
use the Random Selection (RS) algorithm defined in Fig. 3. RS consists of two
phases. Phase 1 is the learning phase where the user randomizes to learn the
interference functions. Let Bj(t) be the set of distinct payoffs observed from
channel j up to time t. Then the payoffs in set Bj(t) can be ordered in a de-
creasing way with the associated indices {1, 2, . . . , |Bj(t)|}. Let O(Bj(t)) denote
this ordering. Since the IFs are decreasing, at the time |Bj(t)| =M , the user has
learned gj. At the time | ∪Nj=1 Bj(t)| = MN , the user has learned all IFs. Then,
the user computes A∗ and phase 2 of RS starts where the user randomizes to
converge to the socially optimal allocation.
Random Selection (RS)
1: Initialize: t = 1, b = 0, Bj(1) = ∅, ∀j ∈ N , sample σi(1) from the uniform
distribution on N
2: Phase 1
3: while b < MN do
4: if hσi(t)(t) /∈ Bσi(t)(t) then
5: Bσi(t+1)(t+ 1)← O(Bσi(t)(t) ∪ hσi(t)(t))
6: b = b + 1
7: end if
8: Sample σi(t+ 1) from the uniform distribution on N
9: t = t+ 1
10: end while
11: find the socially optimal allocation σ∗
12: Phase 2
13: while b ≥MN do
14: if hσi(t)(t) < v
∗
σi(t)
then
15: Sample σi(t+ 1) from the uniform distribution on N
16: else
17: σi(t+ 1) = σi(t)
18: end if
19: t = t+ 1
20: end while
Fig. 3. pseudocode of RS
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions of (C3) if all players use RS algorithm to
choose their actions, then the expected time to converge to the socially optimal
allocation is finite.
Proof. Let TOPT denote the time the socially optimal allocation is achieved, TL
be the time when all users learn all the IFs, TF be the time it takes to reach the
socially optimal allocation after all users learn all the IFs. Then TOPT = TL+TF
and E[TOPT ] = E[TL] + E[TF ]. We will bound E[TL] and E[TF ]. Let Ti be the
first time that i users have learned the IFs. Let τi = Ti − Ti−1, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M
and T0 = 0. Then TL = τ1 + . . .+ τM . Define a Markov chain over all N
M pos-
sible configurations of M users over N channels based on the randomization of
the algorithm. This Markov chain has a time dependent stochastic matrix which
changes at times T1, T2, . . . , TM . Let PT0 , PT1 , . . . , PTM denote the stochastic ma-
trices after the times T0, T1, . . . , TM respectively. This Markov chain is irreducible
at all times up to TM and is reducible with absorbing states corresponding to
the socially optimal allocations after TM . Let Tˆ1, Tˆ2, . . . TˆM be the times that
all configurations are visited when the Markov chain has stochastic matrices
PT0 , PT1 , . . . , PTM−1 respectively. Then because of irreducibility and finite states
E[Tˆi] < z1, i = 1, . . . ,M for some constant z1 > 0 . Since τi ≤ Tˆi, i = 1, . . . ,M
a.s. we have E[TL] < Mz1. For the Markov chain with stochastic matrix PTM
all the configurations that do not correspond to the socially optimal allocation
are transient states. Since starting from any transient state the mean time to
absorption is finite E[TF ] < z2, for some constant z2 > 0. ⊓⊔
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the decentralized multiuser resource allocation problem
with various levels of communication and cooperation between the users. Under
three different scenarios we proposed three algorithms with reasonable perfor-
mance. Our future reserach will include characterization of achievable perfor-
mance regions for these scenarios. For example, in case 2 we are interested in
finding an optimal algorithm and a lower bound on the performance.
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